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Christian Dignity and the Overlapping Consensus
Frederick Mark Gedicks*
This Article rejects arguments by Christian leaders, scholars,
and others who lament the secularization of the West and urge
Christian dignity as the foundation of universal human rights. It
argues instead that only a secular conception of dignity free of
Christian metaphysics can create an overlapping consensus in
support of human rights.
Part I describes the roots of Christian dignity in medieval
theology and status. Part II briefly recounts how the Renaissance
and Enlightenment re-centered the end of dignity from knowing
God to knowing oneself, while the Reformation’s extension of
original sin to the intellect left Catholicism as the primary
defender of the medieval dignity tradition in modernity. Part III
shows that unprecedented religious difference and moral
pluralism in the West make the Christian dignity promoted by
religious conservatives implausible as the ground of universal
human rights. The theological and natural law underpinnings
and the political implications of Christian dignity alienate and
exclude unbelievers, non-Christians, and even many Christians,
impeding the formation of a stable political consensus supporting
human rights. Part IV concludes with observations about why
conservative Christians might find the overlapping consensus
attractive, and why they might not.

* Guy Anderson Chair & Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School,
Provo, Utah, USA; gedicksf@law.byu.edu. I received helpful comments and criticisms from
my faculty colleagues at a BYU Law School workshop; from Nicholas Aroney, Joel Harrison,
Andrea Pin, and Dmytro Vovk in a webinar sponsored by the BYU International Center for
Law & Religion Studies; from participants in a Zoom workshop sponsored by the Nootbaar
Institute of Pepperdine Caruso School of Law; and from Ryan Davis, Andy Koppelman,
Rev. Craig Mousin, and Marco Ventura. BYU Research Librarian Iantha Haight provided
indispensable help locating sources, and Brickelle Bro, Mackenzie Knapp, and Spencer Ostler
supplied excellent research assistance. Errors that remain are mine.
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INTRODUCTION: AN UNFIRM FOUNDATION
Human dignity is ubiquitous in contemporary rights discourse.
International rights agreements guarantee dignity,1 as do the
constitutions of most Western democracies.2 Courts throughout the
world rely on dignity in deciding human rights cases,3 and
1. E.g., G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 5 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR];
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 1 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR]; Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter EUROPEAN CONVENTION];
Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty pmbl., opened for signature
May 3, 2002, C.E.T.S. 187 (entered into force Jan. 7, 2003); see also G.A. Res. 217 A, A Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UNIVERSAL DECLARATION].
2. Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights,
19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 656 (2008); e.g., BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
art. 1, at 15 (Christian Tomuschat et al., trans. 2019) (1949), https://www.btgbestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf; Art. 3 COSTITUZIONE [COST.] (It.).
3. McCrudden, supra note 2, at 683–85; e.g., S.W. v. United Kingdom, App. No.
20166/92, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 363, 402 (1995) (declaring human dignity “the very essence” of
the European Convention). Although the U.S. Constitution does not expressly protect
human dignity, the U.S. Supreme Court routinely invokes it in constitutional rights
decisions. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1727 (2018) (sexual-orientation discrimination); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015)
(LGBTQ access to marriage); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (racial discrimination);
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scholars, jurists, and clerics on both sides of the Atlantic explore its
meaning for human rights.4
In concert with conservative Christian leaders who decry the
marginalization of Christianity in the West,5 a strand of dignity
scholarship argues the relevance and even preeminence of
Christian dignity in relation to human rights. Some scholars
contend that secular conceptions of dignity cannot be understood

Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (sex discrimination); Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (joint opinion of Kennedy, O’Connor & Souter, JJ.) (access to
abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (married use of contraception);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (bodily integrity).
4. See, e.g., AHARON BARAK, HUMAN DIGNITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (Daniel Kayros trans., 2015); ERIN DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS:
COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE WORTH OF THE HUMAN PERSON (2013); CATHERINE DUPRÉ,
THE AGE OF DIGNITY: HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EUROPE (2015) [hereinafter
C. DUPRÉ]; RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (2011); GEORGE KATEB,
HUMAN DIGNITY (2011); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE NEW RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE:
OVERCOMING THE POLITICS OF FEAR IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 6068 (2012); MICHAEL E. PERRY,
A GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY 27–35 (2017); MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND
MEANING (2012); ANDREA SANGIOVANNI, HUMANITY WITHOUT DIGNITY: MORAL EQUALITY,
RESPECT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2017); JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK & RIGHTS
(Meir Dan-Cohen ed., 2015); HUMAN DIGNITY IN CONTEXT: EXPLORATIONS OF A CONTESTED
CONCEPT (Dieter Grimm et al. eds., 2018) (hereinafter DIGNITY IN CONTEXT];
UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013) [hereinafter
UNDERSTANDING DIGNITY]; Jove Jim S. Aguas, The Notions of the Human Person and Human
Dignity in Aquinas and Wojtyla, 3 KRITKE 40 (2009); Nicholas Aroney, The Rise and Fall of
Human Dignity, 46 BYU L. REV. 1211 (2021); Jasper Doomen, Beyond Dignity, 57 ARCHIV FÜR
BEGRIFFSGESCHICHTE 57 (2015); Joel Harrison, Christian Accounts of Religious Liberty:
Two Views of Conscience, 46 BYU L. REV. 1273 (2021); Stamatina Liosi, Why Dignity Is Not the
Foundation of Human Rights, 8 PUB. REASON 51 (2017); McCrudden, supra note 2;
Andrea Pin & Luca P. Vanoni, Catholicism, Liberalism, and Populism, 46 BYU L. REV. 1299
(2021); POPE PAUL VI, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, ON THE
RIGHT OF THE PERSON AND OF COMMUNITIES TO SOCIAL AND CIVIL FREEDOM IN MATTERS
RELIGIOUS (1965) [hereinafter DIGNITATIS HUMANAE], http://www.vatican.va/
archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatishumanae_en.html.
5. See, e.g., Joint Declaration of Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All
Russia (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2016/
february/documents/papa-francesco_20160212_dichiarazione-comune-kirill.html;
Elder Dallin H. Oaks, Religious Values and Public Policy, Address to the Brigham Young
University
Management
Society,
Washington,
D.C.
(Feb.
29,
1992),
https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/study/ensign/1992/10/religious-values-andpublic-policy?lang=eng; Rev. Ravi Zacharias, Interview, Defending Christianity in a Secular
World, 13 ENRICHMENT 20, 21 (Fall 2008); see also Elder Lance B. Wickman, Religious Freedom
in a Secular Age: Fundamental Principles, Practical Priorities, and Fairness for All,
Address at the 2016 Brigham Young University Religious Freedom Conference (July 16, 2016)
(“[T]he sphere for the free and open exercise of religion is shrinking as society grows more
indifferent toward religion and as government enforces secular values in areas once
considered private.”).

1247

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

46:5 (2021)

apart from their roots in the Christian tradition.6 Some go further,
suggesting that these roots justify sectarian Christian preferences
by the state.7 Still others insist that only the prism of Christian faith
yields the correct view of dignity and human rights.8
This essay is addressed to these and others who lament
the secularization of Western societies and urge Christian dignity
as the foundation of universal human rights. Unprecedented
religious difference and moral pluralism in the West have made
Christian dignity implausible as the ground for human rights.
The theological underpinnings and political implications of
Christian dignity alienate and exclude unbelievers, unaffiliated
believers, adherents to non-Christian religions, and even many
Christians, impeding construction of a firm foundation for human
rights. If Christian dignity is to be the ground of human rights, they
will rest on a perpetually infirm foundation. Only a political
conception of dignity free of Christian metaphysics can provide
that foundation.
This essay proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the roots of
Christian dignity in medieval theology and status. Part II briefly
recounts how the Renaissance and Enlightenment re-centered the
end of dignity from knowing God to knowing oneself, while the
Reformation’s extension of original sin to the intellect left
Catholicism as the primary defender of Christian dignity in the face
of modernity. Part III, the heart of the Article, shows why
grounding universal human rights in Christian dignity is unlikely
to underwrite an overlapping consensus about the value and
necessity of such rights. Part IV concludes with observations about
6. See, e.g., GEORGE WEIGEL, THE CUBE AND THE CATHEDRAL: EUROPE, AMERICA, AND
POLITICS WITHOUT GOD 19–20, 57–58 (2005); David P. Gushee, A Christian Theological Account
of Human Worth, in UNDERSTANDING DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 275, 288; Brett G. Scharffs,
Why Religious Freedom? Why the Religiously Committed, the Religiously Indifferent, and Those
Hostile to Religion Should Care, 2017 BYU L. REV. 957, 962, 964.
7. See, e.g., Scharffs, supra note 6, at 964 (defending state-mandated display of crucifix
in Italian classrooms by reference to Catholic dignity theology); Adrian Vermeule,
A Christian Strategy, FIRST THINGS (Nov. 2017) (arguing for a Catholic “integralism” that
would infuse politics and law with Catholicism); see also STEVEN D. SMITH, PAGANS AND
CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY: CULTURE WARS FROM THE TIBER TO THE POTOMAC 278–79 (tentatively
endorsing T.S. Eliot’s vision of a Christian society); Michael Stokes Paulson, The Priority of
God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159, 1203–06 (2013) (arguing that the Free
Exercise Clause of the U.S. First Amendment protects only duties owed to a transcendent
Creator-God).
8. See, e.g., Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Liberty of the Church: Source, Scope, and
Scandal, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 165, 181–92 (2013); Janet Soskice, Human Dignity and the
Image of God, in UNDERSTANDING DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 229, 240–43.
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why conservative Christians might find the overlapping consensus
attractive, and why they might not.
I.

MEDIEVAL DIGNITY

The idea of dignity was present in antiquity,9 but the idea
of Christian dignity arose from theology and social rank in the
Middle Ages.
A. Imago Dei
Early Christians adopted the Jewish belief that the dignity of
humankind lies in its creation in the image of God.10 “And God
said: ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness . . . .’ And
God created man in His own image, in the image of God created
He him; male and female created He them.”11 Christian theology,
however, demanded reconciliation of creation in the image of
Judaism’s monotheist God with Trinitarian doctrine, which teaches
that God is three manifestations of a single divine essence. As James
Hanvey summarized the problem:
If Christian revelation is true, and God is a Trinity and the human
person is made in the image of God, then we must in some way
be able to discover the imago Trinitatis in the human person.
If we cannot, then the coherence of revelation and its truth
become questionable.12

Augustine argued that the Trinitarian image of the Christian
God, imprinted on humankind at creation, is the unity of
“memory,” “understanding,” and “will.”13 These are three
manifestations of the “intellect” of the soul, or its power to reason.14
Creation “in the image of God,” therefore, meant the divine

9. See McCrudden, supra note 2, at 656–58; e.g., CICERO, DE OFFICIIS bk. I, at 109
(Walter Miller trans., 1913) (44 B.C.E.).
10. See BARAK, supra note 4, at 18–21; Sergio Dellavalle, From Imago Dei to Mutual
Recognition: The Evolution of the Concept of Human Dignity in the Light of the Defence of Religious
Freedom, in UNDERSTANDING DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 435, 438.
11. Genesis 1:26, 27 (Jewish Publication Society of America).
12. James Hanvey, Dignity, Person, and Imago Trinitatis, in UNDERSTANDING DIGNITY,
supra note 4, at 209, 218.
13. ST. AUGUSTINE, THE TRINITY bk. VIII, at 258–60 (Stephen McKenna trans.,
Charles Dollen ed., 1965) (c. 417 C.E.).
14. Id., bk. VIX, at 256–57, 263; see also Hanvey, supra note 12, at 218. For Augustine,
memory, understanding, and will “are the actions of the one mind.”
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investment in each person of the capacity to act (will) in accordance
with one’s knowledge (understanding) and experience (memory).
Centuries later, Thomas Aquinas specified what Augustine
never quite said: the dignity of humankind is precisely its power to
act with conscious rationality, as does God. Aquinas argued that
persons affirmatively act on their reason, rather than being
passively acted upon by external forces, like animals.15 This power
to reason is qualitatively the same power possessed by God, albeit
diminished in human beings:
Since . . . man is said to be made to God’s image, in so far as the
image implies an intelligent being endowed with free choice and
self-movement, . . . it remains for us to treat of His image, that is,
man, according as he too is the principle of his actions, as having
free choice and control of his actions. 16

In the Thomist tradition, the dignity of human beings lies in
their reflection of the image of God as a reasoning being possessed
of freedom to act on his reason.17 Centuries later, this conception of
human dignity informed the Second Vatican Council’s statement
on religious freedom.18 As John Paul II later declared, creation in
God’s image gave to humankind the “spiritual faculties” of
“reason, discernment between good and evil, and free will.”19
B. Noble Dignity
The Thomistic tradition of dignity developed against a sociolegal conception of dignity embedded in the feudal hierarchies of
medieval monarchs and the Church. Those of noble birth or title
enjoyed special privileges. They were immune from lawsuits by
15. See I ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 162 pt. I, Q. 29, art. i, co.,
610 pt. I–II, Q. 1, art. i, co. (Dominican Fathers trans., Daniel J. Sullivan rev. trans.) (1485)
[hereinafter AQUINAS, SUMMA] in 19 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD (Robert Maynard
Hutchins ed., 1952).
16. I id. at 609 pt. III, pr; see also I id. at 493 pt. I, Q. 93, art. i, sc. (“[I]ntellectual creatures
alone, properly speaking, are made to God’s image.”).
17. See I id. at 165 pt. I, Q. 29, art. ii; I id. Q. 93, art. vi, ad. 1.
18. DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 4, para. 2 (“It is in accord with their dignity as
persons—that is, beings endowed with reason and free will and, therefore, privileged to bear
personal responsibility—that all men should be at once impelled by nature and also bound
by moral obligation to seek the truth, especially religious truth.”).
19. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: EVANGELICUM VITAE, ON THE VALUE AND
INVIOLABILITY OF HUMAN LIFE para. 34 (Mar. 25, 1995) [hereinafter EVANGELICUM VITAE],
http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jpii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae.html.

1250

1251

Christian Dignity and the Overlapping Consensus

those of lower rank, even for payment of debts lawfully owed, and
they were often exempt from royal taxation.20 Sumptuary laws
reserved certain colors and fabrics for royal and noble clothing, and
only noblemen could wear swords.21 Nobles could not be tried
before a jury that included men of lower rank; Magna Carta’s
celebrated guarantee of trial by a jury of one’s “peers” referred
precisely to the noble privilege of being judged only by those of
equal or higher rank.22 Powerful customs and conventions
restricted nobles to a handful of occupations: defending the
monarchy in warfare, serving in the Church, or managing one’s
land and estates; other occupations, notably “trade” or commerce,
were unacceptably common, beneath one’s dignity as a noble.23
These privileges constituted noble “dignities.”24
Dignity-as-rank contributed both theoretical and practical
elements to dignity-as-imago Dei. The capacities to reason and to act
on reason are bestowed exclusively on human beings. “[U]nlike the
rest of earthly creation, which follows God’s law by nature, human
beings are given a share in divine reason, and the faculty of free
choice . . . .”25 The divine gift of intellect thus raises humankind to
a rank or “dignity” possessed by no other creature.26 Christianity
envisioned a “great chain of being,” in Arthur Lovejoy’s
phrasing,27 originating with God, who guarantees the existence and
meaning of all creation, and descending through angels and
humankind down to the lowest of his creatures.28 The hierarchal
20. See, e.g., John Bell Henneman, Nobility, Privileges, and Fiscal Politics in Late Medieval
France, 13 FRENCH HIST. STUDS. 1, 1 (1983).
21. See, e.g., Josiah C. Russell, The Triumph of Dignity over Order in England,
9 HISTORIAN 137, 146–47 (1947).
22. See Peer, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE def. 4a, https://www-oedcom.proxlaw.byu.edu/view/Entry/139725?rskey=09QTLQ&result=1#eid (“A member of a
rank of hereditary nobility in Britain or Ireland; a duke, marquess, earl, viscount, or baron.”).
23. See J.M. ROBERTS, PENGUIN HISTORY OF EUROPE 160 (1996).
24. WALDRON, supra note 4, at 30–31.
25. Christopher Tollefson, The Dignity of Marriage, in UNDERSTANDING DIGNITY,
supra note 4, at 486.
26. I AQUINAS, SUMMA, supra note 15, at 165 pt. I, Q. 29, art. iii, ad. 2, 406 pt. I, Q. 93,
art. 6, co., 493 pt. I, Q. 93, art. i, sc., 610 pt. III, Q. 1, art.3, sc. & co.; see also KATEB, supra note
4, at 3, 6 (“The core idea of human dignity is that on earth, humanity is the greatest type of
beings. . . . [N]o other species is equal to humanity.”).
27. ARTHUR LOVEJOY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF AN
IDEA (1936).
28. See KATEB, supra note 4, at 25; ROSEN, supra note 4, at 18; see also Genesis 1:26
(Douay-Rheims) (“Let [man] have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the
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ranks of royalty, nobility, commoner, and serf mirrored this
ontotheological hierarchy.29
As a practical matter, imago Dei did not play a central role in
Christian theology until nearly the twentieth century.30 Medieval
Christian leaders enjoyed their high rank; “princes of the Church”
was not merely metaphor.31 Though God bestowed intellect and
will upon all his human creations, some were honored for their
greater portions.32
II.

MODERN DIGNITY

The Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment transformed
dignity as both imago Dei and noble rank. The Thomistic tradition
had embedded dignity within a teleology that prescribed knowing
God as the end of humankind: he granted us dignity that we might
use it to love and worship him.33 The Church’s medieval conception
of religious freedom, as the freedom to live according to the true
religion, reflected this teleology: the natural law does not bestow
upon men and women the freedom “to do whatever we choose but
rather to choose that which is true and good.”34 In modernity, this
teleology came undone.

air, and the beasts, and the whole earth, and over every creeping creature that moveth upon
the earth.”); Psalm 8:6–8 (Douay-Rheims) (“Thou hast made [man] a little less than the
angels . . . . Thou hast subjected all things under his feet, all sheep and oxen: moreover, the
beasts also of the fields. The birds of the air, and the fishes of the sea.”).
29. Cf. ROBERTS, supra note 23, at 150 (“A chain of [feudal] obligations and personal
service could stretch (in theory) from the king down through his great men and their
retainers to the lowest of the free.”).
30. E.g., POPE LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: RERUM NOVARUM, ON CAPITAL AND
LABOR (May 15, 1891) [hereinafter RERUM NOVARUM], http://www.vatican.va/content/leoxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum.html; see Ingolf U.
Dalferth, Religion, Morality and Being Human: The Controversial Status of Human Dignity, in
DIGNITY IN CONTEXT, supra note 4, at 69, 70.
31. See COLUMBIA HISTORY OF THE WORLD 380 (John A. Garraty & Peter Gay
eds., 1972); Aroney, supra note 4, at 1218.
32. See ROSEN, supra note 4, at 18.
33. E.g., II AQUINAS, SUMMA, supra note 15, at 437 pt. II-II, Q. 10, art. xii, ad. 4, 731
pt. III, Q. 4, art. ii, ad. 2, in 20 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD (Robert Maynard
Hutchins ed., 1952) (1485); AUGUSTINE, supra note 13, bk. 8, at 262–63; cf. John 17:3
(Douay-Rheims) (“Now this is eternal life: That they may know thee, the only true God, and
Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent.”).
34. Hanvey, supra note 12, at 221; see also Harrison, supra note 4, at 1279 (“[C]onscience
is . . . understood as the site where a person fulfils the duty to respond to the truth
about God.”).
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A. Renaissance
Renaissance philosophers redirected the teleology of imago Dei
inward, making dignity a tool in service of humanity rather than
God.35 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, for example, reworked
dignity from the freedom to pursue God into the freedom of selfdetermination: creation in God’s image is oriented, not to
knowledge of God, but to the fashioning of one’s “own being” by
one’s “own free will.”36 The intellect was still a gift of God, but its
end was now to know oneself rather than God.37 Henceforth human
beings would themselves be responsible for shaping the character
and content of their lives.38
B. Reformation
The Reformation shattered the formal theological unity of Latin
Christianity. Among its victims was the doctrine of original sin. The
Church had long taught that original sin had corrupted the will but
not the intellect; humankind lost the ability perfectly to conform its
behavior to the demands of natural law and justice, but not the
ability to know these through the exercise of reason.39 As Aquinas
concluded, original sin “cannot entirely take away from man the
fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be
capable of sin.”40 By contrast, Martin Luther and John Calvin taught
that original sin had wholly corrupted reason and the intellect,
making them unreliable guides to justice or truth.41

35. BARAK, supra note 4, at 25.
36. GIOVANNI PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, ORATION ON THE DIGNITY OF MAN 7 (2005)
(1496); see also C. DUPRÉ, supra note 4, at 30 (Mirandola reworked “the Imago Dei paradigm
in the light of man’s new freedom constantly to shape and determine his identity.”).
37. As Professors Aroney and Harrison pointed out to me, self-discovery is also a
theme in Augustine—though still oriented to knowing God. See, e.g., ST. AUGUSTINE,
THE CONFESSIONS bk. X (R.S. Pine-Coffin trans., 1961) (c. 397–98 C.E.).
38. LOUIS DUPRÉ, PASSAGE TO MODERNITY: AN ESSAY IN THE HERMENEUTICS OF
NATURE AND CULTURE 125 (1993) [hereinafter L. DUPRÉ].
39. See HEINRICH ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN LEGAL AND SOCIAL
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 48 n.20 (Thomas R. Hanley trans., 1998); TATHA WILEY, ORIGINAL
SIN: ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENTS, CONTEMPORARY MEANINGS 141–42 (1989); Dellavalle,
supra note 10, at 438; Aroney, supra note 4, at 1222.
40. II AQUINAS, SUMMA, supra note 15, at 179 pt. III, Q. 85, art. 2, co.
41. L. DUPRÉ, supra note 38, at 204, 211; WILEY, supra note 39, at 142; Dellavalle,
supra note 10, at 438–39.
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The Reformers rested their rejection of reason on Augustine—
Luther was an Augustinian monk—despite Augustine’s
prominence in identifying dignity with intellect.42 Writing as the
Roman empire collapsed around him, Augustine “viewed the
earthly city as a symbol of violence and oppression, blighted by sin
and incapable of offering its inhabitants the justice and peace of the
City of God.”43 Many Protestants, therefore, teach that reason’s
original corruption disqualifies the intellect as a means of
identifying the natural law, and diminishes its theological place.44
Protestant dignity lies more in one’s acknowledgment of God’s
grace in the face of inescapable sin than in reason and intellect.45
Catholicism thus emerged from the Reformation as the principal
custodian of the medieval dignity tradition.
C. Enlightenment
Mirandola, writing when the Inquisition was still active,
softened the anti-clerical force of dignity-as-self-determination by
emphasizing its divine source. Enlightenment humanists felt no
such need. The decisive figure is Immanuel Kant, who reasoned his
way to dignity-as-autonomy without relying on God or the Church.
Kant is known for the “categorical imperative,” the injunction
that one must always treat people as ends in themselves, and never

Like Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity also rejected the Protestant claim that original
sin irretrievably tainted reason and intellect. See John Witte, Jr., Introduction to CHRISTIANITY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 8, 23–33 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander 2010)
[hereinafter CHRISTIANITY & HUMAN RIGHTS].
42. See Peter King, Damaged Goods: Human Nature and Original Sin, 24 FAITH & PHIL.
247, 248–50 (2007).
43. Tina Beattie, The Vanishing Absolute and the Deconsecrated God: A Theological
Reflection on Revelation, Law, and Human Dignity, in UNDERSTANDING DIGNITY, supra note 4,
at 259, 266; accord L. DUPRÉ, supra note 38, at 33.
44. See BARAK, supra note 4, at 23; J. BUDZISZEWSKI, THE REVENGE OF CONSCIENCE:
POLITICS AND THE FALL OF MAN 80 (1999); ROMMEN, supra note 39, at 54 & n.26;
Beattie, supra note 43, at 266.
45. See, e.g., WILEY, supra note 39, at 142–43 (placing Reinhold Niebuhr’s conception of
human dignity between the Reformers’ insistence that original sin rendered the intellect
wholly corrupt and the Thomistic teaching that original sin left it a reliable path to truth);
Aroney, supra note 4, at 1224–25 (Reformation theologians “tended to place more emphasis
on the fallenness of human nature and its dependence on divine grace for its restoration.”);
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Modern Protestant Developments in Human Rights, in CHRISTIANITY &
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 41, at 155, 162 (Besides the dignity of creation in the image of
God, “every human being has his own personal dignity which resides in his predestination
to personal being.”).
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solely as means to one’s own ends.46 He considered an equivalent
formulation to be, “Act only in accordance with that maxim
through which you can at the same time will that it become a
universal law.”47 A “maxim” is the principle the subject adopts as
her guide to ethical action.48 When faced with an ethical decision,
one should act in accordance with a rule that could be coherently
“universalized” or applied to everyone.49
The key here is Kant’s view that rational beings are free to
choose the moral law by and for themselves, so long as they apply the
same law to others. “Reason . . . refers to every maxim of the will as
giving universal law to every other will and also to every action
towards oneself . . . .”50 This capacity for moral self-governance
constitutes human dignity, “the dignity of a rational being, who
obeys no law other than that which he at the same time gives.”51 Yet
the argument is formal rather than substantive: human dignity
consists in the giving of the moral law to oneself, not in the content
of the law one gives.52
Human dignity is thus the source of incomparable human
worth.53 Whatever “is raised above all price and therefore admits
of no equivalent,” argues Kant, “has a dignity.”54 The self-direction
that makes humanity an end in itself “has not merely a relative

46. IMMANUEL KANT, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) [hereinafter KANT,
Groundwork], in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 41, 80 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) [hereinafter
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY].
47. KANT, Groundwork, supra note 46, at 73 (emphasis omitted); accord IMMANUEL
KANT, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 46, at 353, 379
[hereinafter KANT, Metaphysics of Morals].
Some Kant scholars dispute that these formulations are equivalent. E.g., Christine M.
Korsgaard, Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right to Revolution, in RECLAIMING
THE HISTORY OF ETHICS: ESSAYS FOR JOHN RAWLS 297, 300 (Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman
& Christine M. Korsgaard eds., 1997).
48. KANT, Groundwork, supra note 46, at 73 n.*; KANT, Metaphysics of Morals,
supra note 47, at 379–80.
49. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 56 (2008).
50. KANT, Groundwork, supra note 46, at 84.
51. Id. (emphasis omitted).
52. As always with Kant, what appears to be wildly subjective is objectively ordered
by his postulate that rational beings possess the same “mental hardware” and thus reason to
the same or similar conclusions. See Eugene T. Gadol, The Idealistic Foundations of Cultural
Anthropology: Vico, Kant and Cassirer, 12 J. HIST. PHIL. 207, 219–20 (1974).
53. KANT, Groundwork, supra note 46, at 85.
54. Id. at 84.
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worth, that is, a price, but an inner worth, that is, dignity.”55 Dignity
is priceless because nothing in the human economy matches
its value.
Kant departed from the Christian dignity tradition in at least
three ways. First, the ground of human dignity, the source of
humanity’s incomparable worth, became self-direction.56 After
Kant, “to treat people with dignity is to treat them as autonomous
individuals able to choose their destiny.”57 How one uses her
autonomy is beside the point of its worth in self-determination.
With Kant, human dignity arises from the power of each person to
choose her own path, not from the Christian conformity or moral
attractiveness of the path she chooses.58
Second, God and Christianity play no part in Kant’s
argument.59 Among Kant’s targets were the efforts of Catholicism
and High-Church Protestantism to maintain clerical control.60 The
moral law is not given by the Church to Christians, but by
Christians to themselves. Human dignity is the ability to reason
and to act; it comes, however, not from creation by God in his
image, but from the autonomy each person naturally possesses to
shape her life to her own ends.61
Finally, Kant decentered dignity-as-rank. The Kantian demand
that self-given morality be universally applied logically foreclosed
socio-legal hierarchies. “Where previously dignity was precisely
what attached to the role a person played in society,” after Kant “it
would arise from the person who stood apart from the multiplicity
of roles in which he or she might appear.”62 Because the categorical
55. Id.; see also id. at 85 (“[T]he lawgiving . . . , which determines all worth, must for
that very reason have a dignity, that is, an unconditional, incomparable worth . . . .”).
56. See ROSEN, supra note 4, at 21–22.
57. McCrudden, supra note 2, at 660.
58. Cf. Harrison, supra note 4, at 1294 (observing the contemporary emphasis on “the
centrality of individual judgment—personal autonomy—as the foundation of human dignity
and the concern of political authority”).
59. ROSEN, supra note 4, at 155.
60. See, e.g., Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question, What Is Enlightenment?, in
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 46, at 15, 17–21 (arguing that “enlightenment” is the
capacity and the willingness to make life decisions using one’s own reason and
understanding, without direction from religious and other external authorities).
61. Professor Aroney notes that this orientation left behind the interrelatedness of
persons and the role of groups intermediate between individual and state, both integral to
the Catholic conception of dignity. Aroney, supra note 4, at 1234–35.
62. David Walsh, Dignity as an Eschatological Concept, in UNDERSTANDING DIGNITY,
supra note 4, at 245, 249–50.
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imperative requires application of one’s maxim of action to all in
the same way it applies to oneself, it cannot logically accommodate
social ranks and their accompanying “dignities.” In Kant’s world,
all human beings possess the same dignity in the same measure.63
III. EQUAL DIGNITY
Kant and Enlightenment notwithstanding, dignity-as-rank
persisted in Catholic Christianity into the twentieth century. Leo
XIII’s 1891 encyclical on the “dignity of labor” laid the foundation
for a doctrine aimed at lifting up workers and the poor,64 but
nonetheless reinforced dignity-as-rank by implicitly prioritizing
capital to labor and men to women.65 While all people possess
dignity from their creation by God, this dignity consisted “in their
playing the role that is appropriate to their station within a
hierarchical social order, one in which some are ‘nobler
than others.’”66
Dignity-as-rank began to crumble after World War II.
Challenged by the economic equality and political justice agenda of
powerful Marxist movements (especially in Italy), and stung by
accusations that it did little to stop the Holocaust, the Church
rethought its role in advancing human dignity. It reconceptualized
itself as a kind of “human-dignity umbrella,” which shelters the
exercise of human rights by all people, Catholic or not, believing or

63. Jeremy Waldron has elaborated equal rank and status into a general theory of
dignity and human rights. See WALDRON, supra note 4. Of course, even liberal democracies
have perpetuated a sort of hierarchical rank with salutations, titles, and deference for
government officials, doctors, lawyers, academics, and others whose education or
accomplishments are thought to represent special “merit.”
64. See McCrudden, supra note 2, at 662.
65. See RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 30, paras. 4–5, 46–47 (condemning economic
redistribution); id. paras. 17, 19, 34 (suggesting that economic inequality is dictated by the
natural law); id. paras. 36, 42 (implying that women in the workplace cause immorality,
declaring women unsuited for certain occupations, and concluding that women be confined
to the domestic sphere to which they are naturally suited); see also ROSEN, supra note 4, at 48–
51 (arguing the profoundly hierarchical character of Leo’s economic and social thinking);
SANGIOVANNI, supra note 4, at 29–30 (noting the nineteenth-century Church’s “ambivalent
relationship with democracy,” “religious freedom,” and “natural liberal rights”).
66. ROSEN, supra note 4, at 49.
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not;67 John Paul II particularly embraced this role.68 Though
Christian dignity remains largely informed by a distinctively
Catholic theology, that theology now concludes that dignity is
equally the entitlement of all members of the political community.69
Nevertheless, even this expanded conception of Christian dignity
is insufficient to ground universal human rights.
A. An Overlapping Consensus
One of John Rawls’s insights was that a stable political order
safeguarding basic human rights cannot persist in conditions of
pluralism unless its participants abandon the quest to enact their
differing metaphysical commitments into law.70 Only by bracketing
these commitments can an “overlapping consensus” emerge that
attracts broad support precisely because it safeguards basic rights
that allow individual pursuit of the good and the true.71 The
emphasis on political rather than metaphysical consensus explains
“how, given the plurality of conflicting comprehensive religious,
philosophical, and moral doctrines always found in a democratic
society . . . [,] free institutions may gain the allegiance needed to
endure over time.”72
Rawls’s theory is controversial,73 though even his critics
concede he is the starting point for contemporary political

67. See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Pasquale Annicchino, Cross, Crucifix, Culture:
An Approach to the Constitutional Meaning of Confessional Symbols, 13 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 71,
124–27 (2014).
68. RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 88 (1984); Zachary R. Calo, Catholicism, Liberalism and Human Rights,
1 J. CHRISTIAN LEGAL THOUGHT 9 (2011); Pin & Vanoni, supra note 4, at 1304.
69. See Aroney, supra note 4, at 1234–35; see also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
70. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133–34 (2005) [hereinafter RAWLS,
LIBERALISM]. Rawls specified these “basic rights” as political and civil equality, equal
opportunity, economic reciprocity, and mutual respect. See id. at 139.
71. Id. at 138–42; see also id. at xlv (“[R]ather than confronting religious and nonliberal
doctrines with a comprehensive liberal philosophical doctrine, the thought is to formulate a
liberal political conception that those nonliberal doctrines might be able to endorse.”).
For Rawls’s detailed exposition of the overlapping consensus, see id. at 133–72, 385–95.
72. John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV.
233, 234 (1989).
73. See, e.g., Michael G. Barnhart, An Overlapping Consensus: A Critique of
Two Approaches, 66 REV. POL. 257 (2004); Maurits De Jongh, Le libéralisme politique se
réfute-t-il lui-même? [Is Political Liberalism Self-Defeating?], 68 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SCIENCE
POLITIQUE 515 (2018).
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philosophy.74 But one need not accept Rawls’s normative claims to
recognize the descriptive insight illuminated by his argument for a
metaphysically thin consensus. In radically plural societies
committed to the protection of human rights, a thick metaphysical
account of the truth is unlikely to attract broad, enduring support
for democracy and human rights without state repression that
would undermine both.
B. Problems for Christian Dignity
The question whether Christian dignity ought to ground
human rights in the overlapping consensus raises the further
question, which Christianity? One might construct a universal or
widely shared Christianity for analytic purposes, but this would
indeed be a fabrication—Christian denominations and sects are
innumerable and sharply diverse in their beliefs and practices.
Only a Christianity raised to a very high level of abstraction
could authentically incorporate all or most of contemporary
Christian belief.
A highly abstract Christianity is unlikely to capture the real
problems of building the overlapping consensus on Christian
dignity. Abstract Christianity is not the root of political conflicts in
the West. Politically liberal Christians, like the Protestant
“mainline” in the U.S. and the remnants of state churches in
Europe, have, for the most part, already adapted their beliefs to an
overlapping political consensus.75 It is conservative Christianity—
Catholicism and evangelical Protestantism—that currently insists
on a Christian ground of human rights in tension with
overlapping values.76
Rather than attempt to fashion a generalized Christianity,
therefore, I will use contemporary expressions of conservative
Christianity to analyze its relation to the overlapping consensus.
The metaphysics of conservative Christian dignity renders it an
inapt foundation for contemporary human rights, for at least three
reasons: the stringency of the Catholic teleology that primarily
74. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 183 (1974) (“Political
philosophers now must either work within Rawls’ theory or explain why not.”).
75. See, e.g., OLIVIER ROY, IS EUROPE CHRISTIAN? 62 (Cynthia Schoch trans., 2019)
(“The dominant trend in European Protestantism is the self-secularization of the religious
sphere, both in terms of morals—the best of Christianity resides in ethics, which are
universal—and in terms of theology—God reveals himself in the profane.”).
76. See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text.
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informs its contemporary content, its tension with Western
commitments to political and social equality, and its prioritization
of the good to the right.
1. Catholic teleology
John Paul II sometimes spoke of Christian dignity in Kantian
terms,77 yet his conception of dignity could not have been more
different. Christian dignity and its succeeding Enlightenment
conceptions both incorporate the individual power to make of
oneself what one will, but for quite different ends. Christian dignity
is oriented to an external good (knowledge and love of God),
whereas Kantian dignity is oriented to an internal one (realization
of the self as its own end).78 Kant understood personal freedom to
be constrained by the reality that it “coexist with the freedom of
every other,”79 whereas the Pope affirmed transcendent constraints
beyond the competing claims of mere mortals.80
It would seem self-evident that a political consensus founded
on Christian dignity is unlikely to attract non-Christian and
unbelieving members in a pluralistic polity. Christian dignity
presupposes the God who fulfilled the promises of the Old
Testament with the Gospel of the New; it offers something
theologically unpalatable to almost every other species of belief—
the mystery of the Trinity, the Crucifixion, and the Resurrection to
nonsalvific or more rigorous monotheists (Jews and Muslims); a
commitment to monotheism that contradicts polytheism (Hindus)
and animistic spirituality (First Nations, Native Americans, and
other indigenous religions); and an insistence on transcendence to
immanence (Buddhists and other Asian religions).81 On top of all

77. ROSEN, supra note 4, at 99–100 (quoting EVANGELICUM VITAE, supra note 19, para.
19; POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: VERITATIS SPLENDOR para. 48 (1993),
http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jpii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor.html).
78. See John F.X. Knasas, Kantianism and Thomistic Personalism on the Human Person:
Self-Legislator or Self-Determiner?, 7 STUDIA GILSONIANA 437, 444–49 (2018).
79. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 47, at 393.
80. See ROSEN, supra note 4, at 100.
81. Dellavalle, supra note 10, at 439; see also SANGIOVANNI, supra note 4, at 63
(noting the “sectarian character” of imago Dei); SMITH, supra note 7 (arguing for a conflict
from antiquity between pagan immanence and Christian transcendence).
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these are the “nones,” or the “spiritual but not religious,”82 who
might encounter even greater dissonance.
One might object that theological difference does not preclude
political consensus. As James Davison Hunter observed,
contemporary “orthodox” or “traditional” believers may have
more in common with conservatives of other religions than they do
with their “liberal” or “progressive” brothers and sisters of the
same faith.83 This suggests that Christian dignity might similarly
cross religious lines to form an overlapping consensus attractive to
non-Christians and unbelievers.
Ironically, Hunter’s observation illustrates both the need for an
overlapping consensus and how ill-suited Christian dignity is to
ground it. Cultural conservatives are only able to make common
political cause with each other by bracketing deep theological
differences, just as Rawls advises the bracketing of all
comprehensive beliefs.84 But cultural conservatism still leaves out
cultural liberalism; even as culture rather than religion,
conservative Christianity embodies beliefs and commitments that
are not uniformly or widely shared in Western democracies.85
Ronald Dworkin encapsulated the challenge: “[M]any people in
Europe and America insist on connecting human rights with some
religious tradition. If we insist that human rights have finally a
religious source and ground, then our appeal to those rights will
inflame people whose religious traditions and convictions are very
different from our own . . . .”86 (If “inflame” seems overwrought,
“antagonize” or “provoke” does not.) This remains true when the

82. The literature on these “not quite believers” is large and growing. See, e.g., DIANA
BUTLER BASS, CHRISTIANITY AFTER RELIGION: THE END OF CHURCH AND THE BIRTH OF A NEW
SPIRITUAL AWAKENING (2012); Rebecca French, Shopping for Religion: The Change in Everyday
Religious Practice and Its Importance to the Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 127 (2003); PEW FORUM
ON
RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, “NONES” ON THE RISE (Oct. 9, 2012),
https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2012/10/NonesOnTheRisefull.pdf; Stephen J. Stein, Religion/Religions in the United States: Changing Perspectives and
Prospects, 75 IND. L.J. 37 (2000).
83. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 47 (1991).
84. Hunter and others have noted the political alliances of Latter-day Saints,
evangelical Protestants, and other religious conservatives despite longstanding theological
animosity. See id. at 100, 145, 181; DEAN M. KELLEY, WHY CONSERVATIVE CHURCHES ARE
GROWING 138–42 (1972).
85. See generally LORI G. BEAMAN, THE TRANSITION OF RELIGION TO CULTURE IN LAW
AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE (2020) (detailing the political rifts and social schisms created when
Christianity is treated as culture rather than religion).
86. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 339.
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ground of dignity is shifted from Christian theology to Christian
culture. Neither a dignity defined by Trinitarian teleology nor one
enlisted with religious conservatives in the Culture Wars is likely
to persuade most liberal Christians, non-Christians, or unbelievers
of its preeminent claim to ground universal human rights.87
2. Uncertain equalities
A signal achievement of Western democracy is equality of
rights—the idea that fundamental rights, privileges, and
immunities are held by all, regardless of social rank or status. The
major human rights texts guarantee equal rights, either directly,88
or by general prohibitions of discrimination based on race,
ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation, religion, and other comparable
characteristics.89 The national constitutions of most Western
democracies contain similar provisions.90
Many Western democracies also guarantee equal dignity
in tandem with equal rights.91 This is the legacy of Kant.
Beyond respect for one’s own life, argued Dworkin, the categorical
imperative “entails a parallel responsibility for the lives of all
human beings. If you are to respect yourself, you must treat their
lives, too, as having an objective importance.”92 But Kantian dignity

87. Dellavalle, supra note 10, at 440.
88. E.g., U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 1, ¶ 2; UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, supra note 1,
pmbl., art. 1.
89. E.g., UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, supra note 1, art. 2; ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 2, ¶ 1,
art. 26; EUROPEAN CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 9, protocol 12, art. 1.
90. E.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, ¶¶ 15(1), 28 (U.K.); 1958 CONST. pmbl.,
art. 1, (Fr.); BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY art. 3, at 15 (Christian
Tomuschat et al. trans., 2019) (1949), https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf;
Art. 3 COSTITUZIONE [COST.] (It.); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (1868) (Equal Protection
Clause). In the United States, the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment prohibit religious
discrimination. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520 (1993); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
91. E.g., Art. 3 COSTITUZIONE [COST.] (It.) (“All citizens have equal social dignity . . . .
It is the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles of an economic or social nature which
constrain the freedom and equality of citizens . . . .”) (translated in CONSTITUTION OF THE
ITALIAN REPUBLIC, Art. 3, https://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/
costituzione_inglese.pdf); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 660, 672–73, 681 (2015)
(holding that the “equal dignity” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
marriage equality); see UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, supra note 1, art. 1 (“All human beings are
born free and equal in dignity and rights.”).
92. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 255.
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is more than the right to respect; it is the right to the same respect.93
With Kant, “dignity and equality go together.”94 Equal dignity, in
its turn, implies a particular understanding of equal rights. Both
Christian and Kantian dignity incorporate self-determination as a
matter of morality and ethics (though, again, each differs in its end
or purpose). If dignity is the power to decide for oneself what the
good is and to conform oneself to it, as Kant maintained, then
the right to equal dignity guarantees this to everyone in the
same measure.
Different people will decide upon different and often
incommensurable ideas of the good, so conflicts are inevitable.
A government that is both ordered and democratic requires a
means of mediating these conflicts. Unlike moral and ethical
decisions, however, resolution of legal conflicts over the good
cannot be left to personal choice, but must be enforced by state
coercion under law, through the definition of rights.95 Rights are
not suggestions; they embody the respect the state may demand that
its citizens afford each other, the actions it may properly coerce
citizens to take (or to refrain from taking) in their interactions
with others.96
This prevents Christian dignity from adequately grounding
human rights, even now that its principal guardian teaches
universal entitlement to those rights. Neither dignity nor rights can
depend on moral concessions by others. History teaches that
Christians, like most of humankind, do not consistently endorse or
respect human rights; today, some conservative Christians hesitate
or refuse to recognize rights widely recognized in liberal
democracies, while some Catholic scholars even question the
Church’s commitment to liberalism itself.97 People are owed

93. Isabel Trujillo, Dignity, Rights, and Virtues in the Department of Value, in DIGNITY IN
LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF RONALD DWORKIN 246, 260 (Salman Khurshid,
Lokendra Malik & Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco eds., 2018); accord Dalferth, supra note 30, at
91, 124; see also DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 266 (“[T]reating people with the respect we accord
ourselves requires, at a minimum, that we claim no right in ourselves that we do not grant
others and suppose no duty for them we do not accept for ourselves.”).
94. ROSEN, supra note 4, at 31; see also KATEB, supra note 4, at 1 (“[Dignity] now turns
out to mean in its most common use the equal dignity of every person . . . .”).
95. George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 533,
535–43 (1987).
96. See, e.g., WALDRON, supra note 4, at 50; Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in
THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984); Fletcher, supra note 95, at 544.
97. See Pin & Vanoni, supra note 4, at 1299–302.
THE
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dignity and rights irrespective of Christian teachings or their
observance by Christians—indeed, often in the face of those
teachings. Rights grounded in Christian dignity would perpetually
depend on the understanding and evolution of these rights within
Christianity. Human dignity does not consist in what Christianity
teaches is morally owed to others, but the treatment those others
may legally demand—of Christians, non-Christians, and the state
itself—irrespective of what Christians think.
In a society that values equal rights, every right must be
the expression of a reciprocal freedom: the state is only justified
in coercing respect for rights if each right we demand for ourselves
is also afforded to everyone else. As Kant put it, “Any action is
right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with
a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each
can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a
universal law.”98 When a person legally claims more freedom for
herself than she grants to others, she is a hindrance to freedom,
and the state is justified in coercively reigning in her claim, since
the state’s “hindering of a hindrance to freedom” actually
preserves freedom.99
In Western democracies, conservative Christians are often
unwilling to accept the reciprocity of rights that equal dignity
implies. Resistance to antidiscrimination laws is an obvious
example. These laws safeguard the equal dignity of women and of
racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities, by ensuring that they
do not suffer harm or disadvantage from stereotypes, prejudice, or
exclusion. Conservative Christians in the United States often seek a
98. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 47, at 387.
99. Id. at 388 (emphasis omitted). Rawls makes a comparable argument. See JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 31, at 195–201 (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE].
It is often assumed that Kant’s discussion of dignity in Groundwork applies tout court
to his argument for the universal principle of right in Metaphysics of Morals. The latter,
however, does not mention “dignity,” let alone discuss it, and for good reason: the right is
not a matter of morality, but of justified state coercion. BARAK, supra note 4, at 117;
ROSEN, supra note 4, at 90; Fletcher, supra note 95, at 543, 553.
The extent to which Kant’s moral philosophy informs his political philosophy remains
a matter of controversy among Kant scholars. Compare CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING
THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 83–84, 103 n.7 (1996) (arguing for a connection), and
Japa Pallikkathayil, Deriving Morality from Politics: Rethinking the Formula of Humanity, 121
ETHICS 116 (2010) (same), with Herlinde Pauer-Studer, “A Community of Rational Beings”.
Kant’s Realm of Ends and the Distinction between Internal and External Freedom,
107 KANT-STUDIEN 125 (2016) (arguing against a connection), and Christian F. Rostbøll, Kant,
Freedom as Independence, and Democracy, 78 J. POLS. 792 (2016) (same).
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right to be categorically excused from observing norms prohibiting
LGBTQ and (sometimes) sex discrimination, yet seek the protection
of such laws for themselves.100 Conservative Christian nonprofit
and commercial businesses have taken comparable positions in
disputes involving mandatory coverage of contraception and
related reproductive services in employee health plans, seeking
categorical exemptions that vindicate employer free-exercise rights
without concern for the loss of contraception coverage by
employees with different beliefs about contraception.101
In tension with the Western commitment to equality,
conservative Christians claim asymmetric rights of exemption from
laws protecting or enhancing the exercise of reproductive rights
and LGBT antidiscrimination rights, while insisting for themselves
the antidiscrimination protections and social welfare benefits they
deny to others. This makes Christian dignity an implausible basis
for forming an overlapping consensus for the protection of
human rights.
3. Exclusive truth
The refusal of conservative Christians to accept some
applications of equal rights and equal dignity is not simply the
consequence of group self-interest. Conservative Christian
religions—especially Catholicism—adhere to one conception of the
good; they claim that the truth about God and his creation is
accessible to all through the exercise of natural reason.102 Laws,
institutions, and other government actions that do not conform to
100. Compare Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018) (baker arguing that his conservative Protestant beliefs against same-sex marriage
require his exemption from civil rights law requiring him to bake wedding cake for
same-sex marriage), with Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert.
granted, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (Feb. 24, 2020) (No. 19-123) (Catholic Social Services arguing that city
anti-discrimination policy barring it from city-sponsored adoption program because of
opposition to same-sex marriage constitutes unlawful religious discrimination).
101. See, e.g., Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania,
140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020); Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Paying for the Boss’s Beliefs,
WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2014, at A15 cols.3-4 (“Americans must be free to practice their
respective faiths but also free from bearing the burdens of their employer’s faith.”).
102. See DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 4, para. 3 (“Man has been made by God to
participate in th[e divine] law, with the result that, under the gentle disposition of divine
Providence, he can come to perceive ever more fully the truth that is unchanging.”);
e.g., Tollefsen, supra note 25, at 493 (asserting that, because the Catholic conception of
marriage is based on the natural law, it is persuasive even to unbelievers).
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the natural law are unjust or deficient;103 all persons, therefore, are
obligated to oppose them or, at least, to withhold their support.104
As Rawls observed, political theories which presuppose “but one
conception of the good which is to be recognized by all persons . . .
tend to be teleological and to hold that institutions are just to the
extent that they effectively promote this good.”105
For example, natural-law theorists argue for a single, true
conception of marriage, necessarily exclusive of other conceptions:
marriage is an intrinsic human good, realized by reproductive
sexual acts within a heterosexual relationship between two persons
committed to each other as friends, partners, and parents.106 While
this definition does not expressly rely on God or transcendent
knowledge, the Biblical injunction that husband and wife become
“one flesh” is an indispensable premise;107 not a mere metaphor for
marital accord,108 this commandment signifies a literal physical

103. See II AQUINAS, SUMMA, supra note 15, at 228 Q. 95, art. 2, co. (“[E]very human law
has just so much of the character of law as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any
point it differs from the law of nature, it is no longer law but a corruption of law.”);
SAINT AUGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL bk. I, Q. 5, at 11 (Anna S. Benjamin trans.,
1964) (c. 395 C.E.) (“I think that a law that is not just is not a law.”); MARK C. MURPHY,
NATURAL LAW IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICS 10–11 (2006) (arguing that an unjust law is
still a law but a defective one, in the same way that a duck that is a poor swimmer is defective
but still a duck).
104. See GERMAIN GRISEZ & RUSSELL SHAW, BEYOND THE NEW MORALITY: THE
RESPONSIBILITIES OF FREEDOM 145 (1974); John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual
Orientation,” 9 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 11, 31 (1995).
105. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 223,
248 (1985); see also RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 99, at 396 (contrasting teleological theories of
the good with metaphysically “thin” theories).
106. See, e.g., ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 168 (1999); Finnis, supra
note 104, at 28.
107. Compare Genesis 2:24 (Douay-Rheims) (“Wherefore a man shall leave father and
mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they shall be two in one flesh.”), with Finnis, supra
note 104, at 30–31 (“A husband and wife who unite their reproductive organs in an act of
sexual intercourse which . . . is of a kind suitable for generation, do function as a biological
(and thus personal) unit and thus can be actualizing and experiencing the two-in-one-flesh
common good and reality of marriage . . . .”), GEORGE, supra note 106, at 139 (describing
marriage as a “two-in-one-flesh communion of persons” that is “an intrinsic . . . human
good”), Tollefson, supra note 25, at 490 (asserting that in one view the marital is realized
when spouses join “so as to become ‘one flesh’”), and John Tuskey, The Elephant in the Room—
Contraception and the Renaissance of Traditional Marriage, 18 REGENT U. L. REV. 315, 320 (2006)
(claiming that contraception is inconsistent with a “one flesh” union).
108. Tuskey, supra note 107, at 320.
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unity achievable only in heterosexual intercourse.109 Conservative
Protestants accept this conclusion without its metaphysics.110
Unbelievers, non-Christians, and many Christians reject this
narrow and complex definition of marriage. Many religions have
no objection to same-sex marriage, and some affirmatively support
it111—even conservative Christians may find the analytic weight
borne by a single Biblical allusion to be more than it, and they, can
bear. Yet acceptance of same-sex marriage would require
conservative Christians to abandon part of the good around which
their religious faith is organized—namely, traditional marriage.
It’s less that they refuse to recognize marriage equality, which
would constitute mere bigotry, and more that they can’t—their
theologies do not permit it.
This conservative Christian conception of marriage runs
through many constitutional issues touching marriage, sexuality,
and reproduction in Western democracies. It is a source of Catholic
opposition not only to the legalization of controversial practices
like human cloning, euthanasia, and genetic manipulation, but also
opposition to abortion (in all circumstances), contraception,
premarital sex, in vitro fertilization, and, of course, same-sex
marriage.112 Conservative Protestants share the opposition to
abortion (in most circumstances), certain forms of contraception,
premarital sex, and same-sex marriage. Yet many Westerners—
perhaps most—engage in or approve of these behaviors and
practices, which generally enjoy constitutional protection.113
109. Id. at 168–69 (“In sexual intercourse between a man and a woman . . . the bodily
parts of the male and the bodily parts of the female participate in a single action, coitus . . . a
unitary action in which the male and the female become literally one organism.”); accord
Finnis, supra note 104, at 28; Tollefson, supra note 25, at 490.
110. See Gilbert Meilaender & Philip Turner, in Contraception: A Symposium, 88 FIRST
THINGS 17, 23–24 (Dec. 1998) [hereinafter Contraception Symposium]; R. Albert Mohler, Jr.,
in id. at 25.
111. FRANK S. RAVITCH, FREEDOM’S EDGE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, SEXUAL FREEDOM, AND
THE FUTURE OF AMERICA 16 (2016).
112. See, e.g., Archbishop Charles J. Chaput, in Contraception Symposium, supra note 110,
at 20; see also ROY, supra note 75, at 99 (John Paul II and Benedict XVI identified
“abortion, euthanasia, same-sex marriage[, and] artificial procreation” as “non-negotiable
moral issues.”).
113. Natural law theorists are clear that the state is obligated to ban abortion, artificial
reproductive technologies, and same-sex marriage; the logic of their position also extends to
prohibition of contraception for married couples. See Ryan T. Anderson, Proxy Wars over
Religious Liberty, NAT’L AFFS., Spring 2020, at 152, 153 (lamenting that “[f]ew people have
argued that contraception is immoral, and that therefore a government mandate requiring
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Rawls labels this prioritization of the good to the right an
obstacle to formation of the overlapping consensus, which is
political, not metaphysical. The overlapping consensus is
constituted by a set of largely instrumental rights oriented to selfrealization, not a single conception of the good.114 Indeed, a
consensus founded on a single conception of the good is neither
“overlapping” (a point of convergence for incommensurable
comprehensive doctrines) nor “political” (resting on a
metaphysically thin set of rights instrumental to individual
autonomy). The overlapping consensus requires, therefore, the
priority of the right to the good, not vice versa.
An overlapping consensus cannot form around the
conservative conception of the good to which Christian dignity is
now oriented. Whenever this good is inconsistent with the exercise
of a basic human right, including equality of rights, Christian
dignity would require that the right give way to the good, as
conservative Christians understood that marriage equality should
have been subordinated to traditional marriage.
IV. CHRISTIAN DIGNITY AND THE OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS
Christian and liberal values enjoyed a tentative alliance during
the post-war years, when Europe and the United States
recommitted themselves to human rights while retaining
traditional Christian values in law.115 Towards the end of the
twentieth century, this alliance came apart under the centrifugal
pressures of increasing secularity and religious and moral
pluralism,116 exposing the current ideological fault: Protestant state
coverage of it is unjust—for everyone, not just religious or conscientious objectors”);
Tuskey, supra note 107, at 315 (“[C]ontraception is antithetical to the traditional
Christian understanding of marriage” and “vitiates the logic” that distinguishes Christian
marriage from same-sex marriage and other relationships.). Some theorists are more
circumspect, suggesting that a prudential respect for marital privacy could justify confining
contraception bans to unmarried persons. See GEORGE, supra note 106, at 152–53;
Finnis, supra note 104, at 1076.
114. Even a political conception of justice must include a few substantive commitments
constituting a “thin theory of the good.” See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 99, at 396–97; RAWLS,
LIBERALISM, supra note 70, at 178.
115. See Pin & Vanoni, supra note 4, at 1303–04; e.g., WIL HERBERG, PROTESTANT—
CATHOLIC—JEW:
AN
ESSAY
IN
AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS
SOCIOLOGY
(1955).
See generally CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 423–72 (2007).
116. See, e.g., ROY, supra note 75, at 71 (suggesting Paul VI reaffirmed traditional
teachings in Humanae Vitae because “[s]ociety’s values were no longer secularized Christian
values”). See generally SMITH, supra note 7, at 258–300; TAYLOR, supra note 115, at 473–504.
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churches (in Europe) and the liberal Protestant “mainline” (in the
United States) “self-secularized” to fit within the more political
consensus that was emerging, while the Catholic Church and
evangelical Protestant faiths soldiered on alone in a quest to
preserve or restore substantive Christian values as the implicit
ground of law and public life.117
Of course, laws in the West no longer implicitly reflect Christian
values. Christian assertions of religious free exercise have
accordingly become more controversial as the sites of
accommodation have become more public.118 In the overlapping
consensus, government and public spaces are either secular or
religiously neutral. Christianity and belief generally are in long
term decline while disaffiliation and unbelief are on the rise. Indicia
of Christian practice are low, even in the United States. European
nationalists now appropriate symbols of Christian faith as markers
of secular political identity without regard for their once-potent
Christian meaning;119 U.S. Establishment Clause doctrine likewise
permits government display of Christian symbols only on the
assumption their meaning is not religious.120
Conservative Christians might be attracted to a metaphysically
thin overlapping consensus as a response to their increasing
minority status. Western democracies guarantee freedom of
worship, freedom from religious persecution and violence, political

117. ROY, supra note 75, at 86; see also Pin & Vanoni, supra note 4, at 1326 (suggesting
that Catholicism continues to endorse human dignity and constitutional culture, but has
departed from liberalism “because it does not perceive it as compatible with key ideals such
as localism or transcendence, or solidarity with the poor”); John Milbank, Dignity Rather Than
Rights, in UNDERSTANDING DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 205 (“Catholicism,
and its development of ‘dignity’, remains at bottom incompatible with liberal notions of
rights and democracy.”).
118. I have discussed the importance of the public/private distinction to the problem
of religious accommodations in Frederick Mark Gedicks, Dignity and Discrimination,
46 BYU L. REV. 961 (2021), and Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Odd Couple: Freedom from Religion
and Religious Group Rights, YOUTUBE (Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=qBA5kJym7Qo&list=PLhqg559k1eTvNNNaJLVUL9-LNTt_SfLQ-&index=41&t=0s.
See also Wickman, supra note 5 (discussing religious accommodations in terms of the
public/private distinction).
119. ROY, supra note 75, at 120–24; Pin & Vanoni, supra note 4, at 1319–20.
120. E.g., Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (state display of
large Latin cross held constitutional because it predominantly signified military sacrifice);
Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. C.L. Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (same regarding Christmas tree and
Hanukkah menorah because context transformed them into secular symbols of the “winter
holiday season”).
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equality among believers and between believers and unbelievers,121
including the right of religions to govern themselves and their
members in private or “internal” spaces, the freedoms to
proselytize willing listeners and to change or abandon religious
belief or affiliation, and the freedom to exercise religion beyond
private spaces so long as the rights of others are not infringed.122
This leaves conservative believers and the groups with which they
affiliate generally free to chart their own courses.123
This political overlapping consensus is attractive to many
religious minorities. Richard Schragger and Micah Schwartzman
observe that Jews have “benefited tremendously from the rise of a
secular state, one in which religious status does not determine
rights of citizenship or, more generally, a person’s life chances.”124
Other religious minorities can say the same, including conservative
Christians. The overlapping consensus would appear even more
attractive if regulation of private religious spaces were relaxed and
private religious speech and exercise not so rigorously excluded
when allowing them would not significantly threaten the rights
of others.125
But the attractiveness of the overlapping consensus to a
religious minority depends first on recognition that it is, in fact, a
minority. Many conservative Christians are not yet reconciled to

121. Marco Ventura, The Formula “Freedom or Religion or Belief” in the Laboratory of
the European Union (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
Modest institutional religious preferences remain in those European countries,
like the United Kingdom, Germany, and Scandinavia, that have retained weak
religious establishments.
122. Cf. McCrudden, supra note 2, at 679 (proposing a “minimum core” or “overlapping
consensus” for dignity consisting of commitment to the “intrinsic worth” of every human
being, the mandatory recognition of this worth by others, and the priority of the individual
to the state).
123. Pin & Vanoni, supra note 4, at 1303; see also WEIGEL, supra note 6,
at 61, 182 (lamenting the substantively thin character of the overlapping consensus).
124. Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Jews, Not Pagans, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
497, 515 (2019).
125. See, e.g., ANDREW KOPPELMAN, GAY RIGHTS VS. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE
UNNECESSARY CONFLICT 2 (2020) (“Most Americans . . . would like to live in peace with their
fellow citizens, and are willing to consider and, if possible, accommodate other people’s
perspectives and fears.”); RAVITCH, supra note 111110, at 19 (Secular and religious moderates
are “caught between religious conservatives who want to roll back advances for LGBT and
reproductive freedom and secular progressives who view all religious freedom laws
as dangerous.”).
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the fact that they can no longer dictate the good to all of society.126
These will not find the overlapping consensus attractive unless and
until they come to terms with the reality that they have been
overtaken as political and cultural arbiters of the West.
In any event, conservative Christianity is an obstacle to
formation of an overlapping political consensus in support of
human rights, and thus ill-suited to provide their foundation, now
and in the future.

126. See, e.g., Ryan T. Anderson & Robert P. George, The Unfairness of the Misnamed
“Fairness for All” Act, J. LEG. ONLINE SUPP., Summer 2020, at 1,
https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg_blog/4/ (arguing that law should incorporate
traditional teachings about gender, sex, and marriage and should fully accommodate
believers in these teachings when the law deviates from them); id. at 7–8.
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